We consider a setting where a coalition of individuals chooses one or several alternatives from each set in a collection of choice sets. We examine the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability. Pareto rationalizability requires that we can endow each individual in the coalition with a preference relation such that the observed choices are Pareto efficient. We differentiate between the situation where the choice function is considered to select all Pareto optimal alternatives from a choice set and the situation where it only contains one or several Pareto optimal alternatives. In the former case we nd that Pareto rationalizability is an np-complete problem. For the latter case we demonstrate that, if we have no additional information on the individual preference relations, then all choice behavior is Pareto rationalizable. However, if we have such additional information, then Pareto rationalizability is again np-complete. Our results are valid for any coalition of size greater or equal than two. JEL Classi cation:C60, C63, D70
Motivation
We determine the computational complexity of validating whether a choice function is consistent with Pareto optimal choice behavior. In concreto, we ask whether there exists an efficient algorithm that can verify whether a given data set on observed choices from a collection of choice sets is consistent with the choices from a coalition of individuals that selects only Pareto optimal alternatives? In general we nd that Pareto optimal choice behavior has either no testable restrictions or that its testable implications are very difficult to verify. For the latter case, this is established by showing that the problem is np-complete. Our ndings bear important empirical implications. e fact that the veri cation of Pareto consistent choice behavior is either trivial or np-complete demonstrates that empirical refutation or acceptance of Pareto optimal choice behavior might be extremely difficult. In fact, all known algorithms to solve np-complete problems suffer from exponential worst time complexity.
Consider an individual who selects from every set in a collection of choice sets one or several alternatives. ese choices are rationalizable if it is possible to endow this individual with a nicely behaved (i.e. transitive and complete) preference relation over the set of alternatives such that for every choice set, the set of chosen alternatives coincides with the set of all maximal elements according to this preference relation. In this single person setting rationalizability is easily veri ed. In a seminal contribution to the literature Richter (1966) demonstrates that a choice function is 'individually' rationalizable if it satis es the congruence condition. is condition requires that the transitive part of the revealed preference relation does not con ict with the strict revealed preference relation. e congruence condition can be tested in three steps. First, one constructs the revealed preference relation from the observed choice behavior. In particular, an alternative is revealed preferred to a second one if the rst was chosen while the second was feasible. Next, one constructs the transitive closure of this revealed preference relation, using for example Warshall (1962) 's algorithm. Finally, it is veri ed that this transitive closure does not contradict the strict revealed preference relation. An alternative is strictly revealed preferred to a second alternative if it was chosen while the second alternative was feasible but not retained. Now consider a setting where multiple individuals in a coalition jointly choose one or several alternatives from every set in a collection of choice sets. It is well known that in a multi-person setting the observed choices do not always coincide with the set of maximal elements from a single preference relation. Even if all individuals are endowed with a transitive and complete preference relation their joint behavior is not necessarily consistent with the rational choice of a single representative individual. Moreover, the outcome of the joint decision will largely depend on the speci c underlying decision process. One of the most straightforward extension of individual rationality to a multi-person setting is rendered by the notion of Pareto optimality. Pareto optimality requires that if an alternative is chosen then there is no other feasible alternative that was preferred to this chosen alternative by all individuals. 1 e principle of Pareto optimality is one of the cornerstones of normative economic analysis and it is beyond any doubt the most frequently used concept in welfare economics and cooperative game theory. Apart from this normative perspective Pareto optimality is also frequently used to explain actual cooperative behavior (e.g. models of household behavior, rm-union wage negotiations, job-matching and jobsearch models, international trade negotiation models and models cartel formation in oligopolistic competition). Nevertheless, despite its wide prevalence as a normative and behavioral principle there are relatively few researches that look at its testable implications.
In this research we look at the computational complexity of verifying whether a given choice function is consistent with Pareto efficient choice behavior from a coalition of individuals. Towards this end we distinguish between two situations. For the rst situation we say that a choice function is Pareto rationalizable if there exist preference relations, one for each member in the coalition, such that the observed choices from a choice set coincide with the entire set of Pareto optimal alternatives from this set. e second situation, which is called weak Pareto rationalizability, only requires that there exist preference relations such that the observed choices are Pareto optimal. In other words, weak Pareto rationalizability does not require that the choice function selects the entire set of Pareto optimal alternatives.
As stated above, Pareto rationalizability requires the chosen alternatives from a choice set coincide with set all Pareto optimal alternatives from this set. Sprumont (2000) investigates the problem of Pareto rationalizability in the setting of a normal form game. In this setting, Sprumont obtained a characterization of Pareto rationalizability for coalitions of size two. Furthermore, he showed that in in this case, Pareto rationalizability is empirically indistinguishable from rationalizability with the noncooperative Nash concept. More recently, Echenique and Ivanov (2011) investigated Pareto rationalizability in a general choice theoretic setting. ey obtained two characterizations for a choice function to be Pareto rationalizable by a two person coalition. e rst characterization reduces the problem of rationalizability to a graph coloring problem. e second characterization obtains an equivalence in terms of the feasibility of a system of quadratic equations. Other relevant researches impose more structure on the underlying framework. For example, Bossert and Sprumont (2002) characterize consistency of a choice function with Pareto efficiency (and individual rationality) in the setting of a two person exchange economy.
In section 3, we derive the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability using a general choice theoretic setting. We proceed in three steps. First we show that Pareto rationalizability is np-complete for all coalitions with at least three individuals. Second, we show that if the coalition has two individuals and if the choice domain is binary (i.e. if the collection of choice sets contains all two element subsets of the universal set of alternatives) then the problem of Pareto rationalizability can be efficiently veri ed. ird, we prove that for coalitions of size two and for non-binary choice domains, the problem of Pareto rationalizability is again np-complete.
In many settings the choices from a coalition do not coincide with the entire set of Pareto optimal allocations. For example, if the coalition chooses by means of a bargaining model (e.g. Nash bargaining or Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky) then the observed outcome will be Pareto optimal but the chosen alternative(s) will not necessarily coincide with the entire set of Pareto optimal outcomes. In this perspective, we say that a choice function is weakly Pareto rationalizable if there exist individual preference relations such that the chosen elements are a subset of the set of Pareto efficient alternatives. To our knowledge this is the rst research that looks at this property in a general choice theoretic setting.
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In section 4 we show that, in general, the notion of weak Pareto rationalizability has no testable constraints on observed choice behavior. In fact, it is quite trivial to show that any choice function is weak Pareto rationalizable by a coalition with two individuals (see Proposition 1). Although this result is probably well known 3 it nevertheless emphasizes that from an empirical viewpoint Pareto optimality is a very weak concept. In order to restore empirical refutability we introduce the concept of a dominance relation. Simply said, a dominance relation is a known subrelation of the Pareto dominance relation: if an alternative a is better than the alternative b according to the dominance relation we know that all individuals in the coalition prefer a over b. We provide several settings where such dominance relation appears naturally. Further, we show that the inclusion of a dominance can lead to non-trivial restrictions on observed choice behavior.
4 Next, we demonstrate that the inclusion 2 However, there has been a growing stream of research that looks at the testable implications of (weak) Pareto rationalizability in a household consumption setting with private and public goods (see, for example, Apps and Rees (1988) ; Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007) . 3 In fact, this result and its proof is very similar to the result of Sprumont (2000, Proposition 1) who showed that weak Pareto rationalizability has no testable implications in the setting of a normal form game. 4 A trivial restriction would be, for example, that a cannot be chosen from {a, b} when b is better than a according to the dominance relation.
of such dominance relation implies that the problem of weak Pareto rationalizability becomes np-complete for all coalitions with at least two individuals.
By establishing the computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto efficient choice behavior we contribute to the small but growing literature that establishes np-completeness results for various economic problems.
5 Particularly relevant to our results is the line of research within this literature that looks at the computational complexity of various (individual or collective) rationalizability problems. Galambos (2009) employs the setting of Sprumont (2000) and shows that the problem of rationalizing a choice function as the outcome of a noncooperative Nash equilibrium in a normal form game is an np-complete problem. Next, Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) consider the model of choice by multiple rationales from Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002) and demonstrates that computing the minimal number of rationales that rationalizes a given choice function is an np-complete problem. Demuynck (forthcoming) establishes similar np-completeness results for the sequential choice model of Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and the model of choice by game trees from Xu and Zhou (2007) . Finally, Talla Nobibon and Spieksma (2010) nd that verifying the revealed preference conditions of Pareto optimal choice behavior for a two person coalition as derived by Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007) is an np-complete problem. is setting differs from ours in the sense that these conditions are obtained from a revealed preference analysis a là Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) (i.e. in a household consumption setting). On the other hand, our paper focusses on the more general, choice theoretic setting.
Section 2 provides a short introduction in to the theory of computational complexity. e readers who are familiar with this theory may safely skip this section. Section 3 introduces the main notation and establishes the computational complexity results for Pareto rationalizability. Section 4 provides computational complexity results for weak Pareto rationalizability. 5 See, among many others, Gilboa and Zemel (1989); Papadimitriou (1992) ; Koller and Megiddo (1992) ; Faigle and Kern (1997) ; Faigle, Kern, and Kuipers (1998); Chu and Halpern (2001) ; Fang, Zhu, Cai, and Deng (2002); Woeginger (2003) ; Baron, Durieu, Haller, and Solal (2004) Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2010) 2 np-completeness is section provides a short introduction to the theory of computational complexity. For the readers who are familiar with the notion of np-completeness this section may be skipped. For compactness, we only provide a very quick introduction alas at the cost of accuracy. For a detailed introduction into the theory of computational complexity and np-completeness in particular we refer to the seminal work of Garey and Johnson (1979) . e theory of computational complexity attempts to answer how much time (and memory) is needed to solve a decision problem. A decision problem is composed of a collection of instances which are the input to the problem and a Yes/No question.
e collection of instances I give the inputs of the decision problem. Normally, it is assumed that these instances are encoded in some convenient way. is is done by using a suitable set of symbols Σ (e.g. Σ = {0, 1}) and by de ning I as a subset of all nite strings of symbols from Σ, i.e. I ⊆ ∪ ∞ n=1 Σ n . For a particular instance I ∈ I we call the smallest n such that I ∈ Σ n the length or size of I. In general, the particular encoding of the instances are not really important and does not really change the results. erefore, one mostly abstains from specifying this encoding.
e Yes/No question of a decision problem corresponds to each instance I ∈ I a Yes or a No depending on whether the particular instance I satis es a certain property. Formally, one could think of the Yes/No question as a function f from the set of all instances I to the binary set {0, 1}. en, we say that an instance satis es the particular property or is a Yes instance if f(I) = 1, and it does not satisfy the property and is a No instance when f(I) = 0. e theory of computational complexity divides decision problems according to the time it takes to compute the value of f(I) given the instance I. Here, time is expressed with respect to the size of the instance. e two most important classes of decision problems are the classes p and np. e class p (polynomial) contains all decision problems which are easy to solve. ese problems can be solved using an algorithms that computes the solution in a polynomial number of steps in terms of the size of the instance. e class np (nondeterministic polynomial) contains all problems that might be difficult to solve (i.e. it might take exponential time) but which are easy to verify. In particular, any solution to the problem can be veri ed in polynomial time.
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Of course, any decision problem in the class p is also in np. At present, it is not known if the converse also holds. e general accepted belief is that p̸ = np. A decision problem which is as difficult to solve as any problem in the class np is called np-hard. A decision problem is np-complete if it is both np-hard and in np. npcomplete problems are among the most difficult problems in the class np. ey are considered to be computationally intractable especially for large instances. In fact, all known solution methods applicable to np-complete problems suffer from exponential worst-time complexity.
In order to understand the proofs in the following sections, it might be interesting to have a quick overview of how np-completeness results are established. In principle, for a candidate decision problem to be np-complete it suffices to demonstrate two things.
First, one must demonstrate that the problem is in the class np. In other words, it must be show that given a proposed polynomial sized solution to the problem it can be efficiently veri ed (i.e. in polynomial time) that this proposed solution is indeed a solution. Second, it must be shown that the np-completeness result is at least as hard as any other problem in np (i.e. the problem is np-hard). e way by which this is established is by taking a known np-complete problem and showing that this problem is a special case of the candidate problem. As such, the candidate problem will be at least as difficult as the np-complete problem. is demonstrates that the candidate problem is also np-hard. Usually, this second step is proved by the technique of polynomial reduction. Let the known np-complete problem be represented by a collection of instances I and the function f : I → {0, 1} and let the candidate problem be represented by the collection of instances I ′ and the function g : I ′ → {0, 1}. In order to show that (g, I ′ ) is np-hard it suffices to demonstrate that there exists a function γ from I to I ′ such that (i) γ is computable in polynomial time and (ii) an instance I ∈ I of the np-complete problem provides a solution to this problem (i.e. f(I) = 1) if and only if the instance γ(I) provides a solution to the candidate problem (i.e. g(γ(I)) = 1). e idea behind this construction is that any algorithm that efficiently computes the function g can also be used to efficiently compute the function f by means of the intermediate function γ (i.e. in order to know the value of f(I) it is always possible to compute g(γ(I))). In this sense, the problem (f, I) is at least as easy to solve as the problem (g, I ′ ).
Pareto rationalizability
In this section we establish the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability.
In doing so we also introduce the necessary notation and de nitions for section 4. Given a relation ≻ on X and a subset A from X we denote by M(≻, A) the set of maximal elements of A according to the relation ≻. Formally,
For a strict positive number K ∈ N and a pro le (list) of preference relations
Equivalently, we can write: Dushnik and Miller (1941) proved that for any partial order ≻ there exists a number K and a pro le {≻ k } k≤K for which ≻ is the corresponding Pareto dominance relation. As such, any partial order is the Pareto dominance relation for some coalition. ey de ned the dimension of a partial order as the smallest number of linear orders whose Pareto dominance relation coincides with this partial order. Formally, a partial order ≻ has dimension less or equal than K if there exists a pro le {≻ k } k≤K of K preference relations such that ≻ is the corresponding Pareto dominance relation. In the same article, Dushnik and Miller also provide two characterizations for a partial order to have a dimension smaller than or equal to 2. Let us now return to the problem of Pareto rationalizability. We de ne a choice function to be Pareto rationalized by a given pro le of preference relations if the choices from each choice set coincide with the set of all Pareto efficient alternatives from this pro le.
De nition 1 (Pareto rationalizability). A choice function c is Pareto rationalized by the pro le of preference relations {≻
where ≻ is the Pareto dominance relation of {≻ k } k≤K .
Given this, we can de ne the following decision problem. In terms of the formulation in the previous section, we have that each instance I of the decision problem K-PRat is determined by a triple (X, D, c) which contains a set of alternatives, a domain and a choice function on this domain. e function f that determines the decision problem K-PRat maps an instance (X, D, c) to 1 if and only if it is Pareto rationalizable by a pro le of K preference relations. Notice that the size of the coalition K is a parameter of the decision problem K-PRat. As such, we actually obtain an in nite number of decision problems, one for each value of K ∈ N. is setting is more restrictive than when we would take the number of individuals in the coalition K as an additional argument of the instance. For example, we could de ne the following problem, PRat. Observe that the instances of the problem PRat consists of quadruples (X, D, c, K). Hence, in this case, the number of individuals K in the coalition is a part of the input to the problem. e problem PRat is np-complete as soon as there exists at least one value of K for which K-PRat is np-complete. However, the converse does not necessarily hold, i.e. it is possible that PRat is np-complete while K-PRat is in p for some value of K. For example, this is the case when K = 1.
K-
We derive the computational complexity of K-PRat (for K ≥ 2) in several steps. Let us rst focus on the case where the size of the coalition K is greater or equal to three. Consider the decision problem of establishing the dimension of a partial order.
K-dimension (K-Dim): Given a partial order ≻, is this relation of dimension K or less?
Yannakakis (1982) proved that the decision problem K-Dim is np-complete for all K ≥ 3. On the other hand, it is known that K-Dim is efficiently solvable, i.e. in the class p, if K is less than or equal to two. We refer to Spinrad (1994) for an overview of the different algorithms that can be applied in this case. We state this result in the next theorem.
Using the result of Yannakakis (1982) we can show that K-PRat is np-complete for all K ≥ 3. e proof uses a reduction from the np-compete problem K-Dim. Given the partial order ≻, we construct an instance (X, D, c) for which the Pareto dominance relations coincides with ≻. For this, it suffices to consider the instance where the domain D coincides with all two element subsets from X. en, if a ≻ b we determine c({a, b}) = {a} and if a ̸ ≻ b and b ̸ ≻ a we set c({a, b}) = {a, b}. As such, we have that the partial relation ≻ has dimension less than or equal to K if and only if the corresponding instance (X, D, c) is rationalizable by a pro le of no more than K preference relations. is shows that K-PRat is at least as difficult to solve as K-Dim. e np-completeness of K-PRat for K ≥ 3 then follows immediately from the np-completeness of K-Dim for K ≥ 3.
When K = 2, this construction can no longer be used to prove np-completeness because we have that 2-Dim is efficiently solvable. However, as long as the domain is binary we can use a similar construction and use the efficiency of 2-Dim to show that 2-PRat is also efficiently solvable. In order to do this, we devise an algorithm that veri es 2-PRat in three steps. First one constructs the partial order ≻ such that a ≻ b if and only if a = c({a, b}). is relation is well de ned because the domain D is binary. In a second step, it is veri ed whether ≻ is of dimension less than or equal to 2. Finally, it is veri ed that for all A ∈ D, c(A) = M(≻, A). It is easy to see that an instance satis es 2-PRat if and only if it passes this algorithm. Also, all three steps in this algorithm can be veri ed in polynomial time. erefore, 2-PRat is in p for all instances with a binary domain.
Finally, we need to consider the case with K = 2 and where the domain is not binary. In this setting we can no longer make use of the problem K-Dim. Surprisingly, we nd that for non-binary domains 2-PRat is also np-complete. e proof relies on a reduction from the np-complete problem 3-SAT. e following theorem summarizes the results from this section.
eorem 2. e decision problem K-PRat is np-complete for all K ≥ 2. If we restrict the domain to be binary, then 2-PRat is in p.
Proof. e proof that K-PRat is np-complete for all K ≥ 3 and that 2-PRat is in p when the domain is binary was given in the main text above. As such, we focus on showing that 2-PRat is np-complete.
Membership in np is easily veri ed. For the second step of the proof we use a reduction from the problem 3-SAT. An instance of 3-SAT consists of a nite set of binary variables v 1 , . . . , v n and a nite set of clauses C 1 , . . . , C m . Each clause contains three literals and each literal is either equal to a variable v i (i = 1, . . . , n) or its negation 1 − v i (i = 1, . . . , n). e following de nes the decision problem 3-SAT. Let v 1 , . . . , v n be a list of variables and let C 1 , . . . , C m be a list of clauses corresponding to an instance of 3-SAT. From these, we construct an instance of 2-PRat: a set of alternatives X, a domain D and a choice function c. We begin by de ning the set X.
• We construct two alternatives a and b.
• For each clause C ℓ (ℓ = 1, . . . , m) we construct an alternative d ℓ .
• For each variable v i (i = 1, . . . , n) we construct four alternatives y i ,ȳ i , w i and w i .
For each clause C ℓ and each literal l k,ℓ (k = 1, 2, 3; ℓ = 1, . . . , m) from this clause we consider the alternatives z k,ℓ andz k,ℓ in X such that if l k,ℓ = v i then z k,ℓ = y i and z k,ℓ =ȳ i , and if l k,ℓ = (1 − v i ) then z k,ℓ = w i andz k,ℓ =w i . e construction of the domain D and the value of the choice function c is given in Table 1 . is construction can be performed in polynomial time.
We begin by showing that when this instance satis es 2-PRat then the corresponding 3-SAT problem has a solution. Consider a rationalization {≻ 1 , ≻ 2 } of the instance (X, D, c) . First, consider the comparison between a and b. We can assume, without loss of generality that a ≻ 1 b and b ≻ 2 a. Otherwise, we can exchange the preferences ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 everywhere. Now, consider the alternatives y i ,ȳ i , w i andw i whose comparisons are determined by conditions (4)-(7). One can verify that comparisons between these alternatives must take one of two mutually exclusive con gurations. We determine the values of the variables v i (i = 1, . . . , n) according to which con guration prevails. e two con gurations are given by Figure 1 where a dashed arrow determines the relation . .
We see that for no variable v i (i = 1, . . . , n) we have that both v i = 1 and v i = 0. Now, consider the choice set {z 1,ℓ , z 2,ℓ , z 3,ℓ , a}, with choices {z 1,ℓ , z 2,ℓ , z 3,ℓ } (see condition (9)). As the instance satis es 2-PRat, we see that there must be at least one alternative in the set {z 1,ℓ , z 2,ℓ , z 3,ℓ } that Pareto dominates a (because, a is not retained). Let z k,ℓ be this alternative. We will show that the literal l k,ℓ must be equal to one. Let us now assume that 3-SAT is satis ed. We need to show that the instance of 2-PRat is a Yes-instance. In other words, we need to show the existence of two preferences that provide a Pareto rationalization. We do this by constructing two acyclic relations ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 that Pareto rationalizes every choice set. ese relations can always be extended to complete, transitive and asymmetric relations (by using, for example, a nite analogue of Szpilrajn (1930) 's Lemma). Table 2 provides a rst set of comparisons conditional on the values of v i (i = 1, . . . , n). Table 3 provides a second set of comparisons conditional on the values of two variables v i and v j (i, j = 1, . . . , n; i < j). It is an easy but cumbersome exercise to verify that these relations rationalize the choice function. Let us now demonstrate that they are acyclic. We focus on the relation ≻ 1 . e proof that ≻ 2 is also acyclic is very similar and left to the reader.
Towards a contradiction, assume that ≻ 1 contains a cycle. We proceed by sequentially excluding elements from this cycle. • if v i = 1, thenȳ i is not in the cycle of ≻ 1 . 
Proof. is follows from the observation that there is no alternative that is dominated byw i (for v i = 0) orȳ i (for v i = 1).
Fact 2. For all
• if v i = 0, then y i is not in the cycle of ≻ 1 .
• if v i = 1, then w i is not in the cycle of ≻ 1 .
Proof. e proof is by (reverse) induction on i, i.e. starting from i = n. Assume that y n (with v n = 0) or w n (with v n = 1) is in the cycle. e next element in the cycle is then given byw n (if v n = 0) orȳ n (if v n = 1). However, this contradicts previous fact. Now, assume that the fact holds for all i with i ≥ t. en let us look at the case where i = t − 1. If v i = 0 then the alternative following y i is eitherw i (according to table 2), w j with j > i and v j = 1, or y j with j > i and v j = 0 (according to table 3). All these cases either contradict the previous fact or the induction hypothesis. is shows that y i is not in the cycle if v i = 0.
On the other hand, if v i = 1 then the alternative following w i is eitherȳ i (according to table 2), w j (with j > i and v j = 1), or y j (with j > i and v i = 0) (according to table 3). ese cases either either contradict the previous fact or the induction hypothesis. is shows that w i is not in the cycle if v i = 1. e proof is completed by induction.
Fact 3. For all
• b is not in the cycle of ≻ 1 . Table 3 : Second set of comparisons for i < j
• If v i = 0, thenȳ i is not in the cycle of ≻ 1 .
•
• a is not in the cycle of ≻ 1 .
Proof.
• e alternative b dominates no other element according to ≻ 1 , hence it must be a terminal node. A such, it cannot be part of a cycle.
• If v i = 1 and the the cycle containsw i , then the next element in the cycle must be w i . However, this contradicts Fact 2.
• If v i = 0 and the cycle containsȳ i then the next element in the cycle must be y i which contradicts Fact 2.
• If the cycle contains d ℓ then the following alternative in the cycle must be either w i orȳ i (see Table 2 ). However, this either contradicts the previous nding or Fact 1.
• If the cycle contains a then the following element in the cycle is either b, c ℓ (ℓ = 1, . . . , m) , w i (with v i = 1) or y i (with v i = 0). All these cases contradict previous ndings.
Fact 4.
For all i = 1, . . . , n,
• if v i = 0, then w i is not in a cycle of ≻ 1 .
Proof. e proof is again by reverse induction on i starting with i = n. If y n with v i = 1 or w n with v n = 0 is in a cycle of ≻ 1 then the next element in the cycle is eitherȳ n ,w n or a, neither of which can be part of the cycle given previous facts.
For the induction hypothesis, assume that the fact holds for all i > t and take the case where i = t − 1. en if v i = 1 and y i is in the cycle then the next element in the cycle is eitherȳ i , a,w i (according to table 2), y j (with v j = 1 and j > i), w j (with v j = 0 and j > i), w j (with v j = 1), or y j (with v j = 0) (according to table 3). All these cases are either excluded by previous facts or by the induction hypothesis. Next assume that v i = 0 and that w i is in the cycle. en the next element in the cycle is eitherw i , a,ȳ i (according to table 2), w j (with v j = 0 and j > i), y j (with v j = 1 and j > i), w j (with v j = 1), or y j (with v j = 0) (according to table 3). Again, all these cases are either excluded by previous facts or by the induction hypothesis. e proof is completed by induction.
We have shown that no element can be part of the cycle of ≻ 1 . From this, it follows that ≻ 1 is acyclic, which concludes the proof.
Weak Pareto rationalizability
As mentioned in the introduction, the notion of Pareto rationalizability is probably to restrictive from an empirical point of view. It is difficult to imagine a real life example where a group of individual selects all Pareto optimal alternatives from a choice set. In this section we look at a weaker notion of Pareto rationalizability where it is only assumed that the observed choices are a subset of the set of Pareto optimal allocations. is motivates the following de nition.
De nition 2. e choice function c on a domain D is weakly Pareto rationalized by the pro le of preference relations {≻
where ≻ is the Pareto dominance relation for the pro le {≻ k } k≤K .
e following result shows that every choice function is weakly Pareto rationalizable for a coalition with two individuals. By replicating the preferences ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 , this result extends to coalitions with more than two individuals.
e proof of the proposition is quite trivial. Consider an arbitrary ranking of the alternatives in X which we represent by the preference relation ≻ 1 . Next, for all a and b ∈ X de ne a ≻ 2 b if and only if b ≻ 1 a. e preference relation ≻ 2 is the inverse relation of ≻ 1 . It follows that the Pareto dominance relation is empty. is in turn implies that for any choice set A ∈ D, the set of Pareto optimal elements from A is the set A itself, M(≻, A) = A.
Despite the simplicity of this result it nevertheless demonstrates that we need to include additional information in order to reject Pareto efficient choice behavior. We proceed by introducing the concept of a dominance relation. 
In order to motivate the idea of a dominance relation we provide several examples where such relation appears naturally. Example 1. Consider the setting where X is a nite set of public goods bundles. en, we could impose that a ◃ b if and only if a > b. If the bundle a has at least as much of every good than the bundle b and if a ̸ = b then a is considered better than b for all individuals in the coalition. is will be the case if individual preferences are monotone.
Example 2. Consider a nite set of outcomes O and let X be a nite subset of the power set of O. Every alternative in X consists of a nite number of outcomes. If all outcomes are desirable we can assume that a ◃ b whenever b ⊂ a, i.e. if all outcomes in b are also contained in a and a contains some outcomes which are not in b then a is better than b for all individuals. Example 3. As a nal example, consider the setting where X is a nite set of income distributions. e individuals in the coalition can be thought of as a group of government representatives who must decide on the most favorable income distribution (for example, by implementing a certain tax policy). In this setting it is logical to assume that a ◃ b if the distribution a rst order stochastically dominates the distribution b.
e inclusion of a dominance relation to the de nition of weak Pareto rationalizability immediately imposes some restrictions on the joint choice behavior. For example, if a ◃ b then it should not be the case that b ∈ c(A) while a ∈ A. If b was chosen over a then at least one individual should prefer b over a. As such, we see that not every choice function will be weakly Pareto rationalizable. However, above example is a rather trivial restriction which has no bite if the domain contains only choice sets with alternatives that are incomparable according to the dominance relation ◃.
As an example of a less trivial restriction, consider the set of alternatives 
It is easy to see that these three conditions are incompatible. erefore, the choice function is not weakly Pareto rationalizable.
e following de nes the decision problem for weak Pareto rationalizability. 
K-weak Pareto rationalizability (K-
e following theorem shows that this problem is np-complete. For K ≥ 3 the proof uses a reduction from the problem K-Dim which was presented and discussed in section 3. e proof for K = 2 depends on a reduction from the problem Monotone Not-al-equal 3-SAT. 8 Although this theorem considers the general case where the dominance relation ◃ is some unrestricted partial ordering, the proof can easily be adjusted such that the dominance relation coincides with a more speci c partial relation like in the examples above.
Proof. First of all, notice that K-WPRat is in np. e second part of the proof is split in two parts. e rst part shows np-completeness for K ≥ 3. e second part proves np-completeness for K = 2. Consider an instance of Monotone Not All Equal 3-SAT, i.e. a set of variables v 1 , . . . , v n and a set of clauses C 1 , . . . , C m . We rst construct the instance (X, D, c, ◃) of 2-WPRat. We begin with the de nition of the set X.
• For each variable v i we construct two alternatives a i andā i . 8 Monotone-not-all-equal-3SAT can be obtained from the np-complete problem Not-all-equal-3SAT (Garey and Johnson, 1979) by replacing all literals of the form (1 − v i ) by a variable y i and adding an additional clause of the form {y i , v i , v i }.
• For each clause c ℓ , we construct 12 alternatives:
and w 1,ℓ , w 2,ℓ , w 3,ℓ .
• We construct an additional alternative d.
e domain D and the choice function is given in Table 4 . is construction can be performed in polynomial time. 
We de ne two functions . . . , m) . If the kth variable in the ℓth clause is equal to the variable v i then we set f(k, ℓ) = a i and f(k, ℓ) =ā i . Further, we denote by k ⊕ 1 the number (k + 1) mod 3.
Next, we construct the dominance relation ◃ as in Table 5 . e structure of the which is a contradiction. Similarly, we can show that if f(k, ℓ) = a i and v i = 0 then z k,ℓ ≻ 2 t k,ℓ . Now assume, towards a contradiction, that M-NAE-3SAT is not satis able. en there must be a clause c ℓ where each variable is either zero or one. If all variables are zero then z k,ℓ ≻ 1 t k,ℓ for all k = 1, 2, 3. is produces the cycle z 1,ℓ ≻ 1 t 1,ℓ ≻ 1 w 1,ℓ ≻ 1 z 2,ℓ ≻ 1 t 2,ℓ ≻ 1 w 2,ℓ ≻ 1 z 3,ℓ ≻ 1 t 3,ℓ ≻ 1 w 3,ℓ ≻ 1 z 1,ℓ . e case where all literals are equal to zero gives an identical cycle for the relation ≻ 2 . is shows that M-NAE-3SAT has a solution.
To see the reverse, assume that M-NAE-3SAT has a solution. Let need to show that the choice function is weakly Pareto rationalizable. If v i = 1 we set a i ≻ 1āi and a i ≻ 2 a i . Else, if v i = 0 we set a i ≻ 2āi andā i ≻ 1 a i . If v i = 1 and f(k, ℓ) = a i then we set z k,ℓ ≻ 1 t k,ℓ and t k,ℓ ≻ 2 z k,ℓ . Otherwise, if f(k, ℓ) = a i and v i = 0 we set z k,ℓ ≻ 2 t k,ℓ and t k,ℓ ≻ 1 z k,ℓ . Further, we include into ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 all the comparisons of ◃. Finally, let c be bottom ranked for both the relations ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 .
Observe that these preferences rationalize the choice function. We still need to show that they can be extended to complete and transitive relations. For this it suffices to show that ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are acyclic. Here, we focus on the relation ≻ 1 . e proof that ≻ 2 is acyclic is very similar.
Assume, on the contrary that ≻ 1 contains a cycle. We proceed by sequentially excluding all elements from this cycle.
Fact 5.ā i is not in the cycle.
If it is, then the next element in the cycle can only be a i . is implies that v i = 0. e third element in the cycle is an alternative z k,ℓ with f(k, ℓ) = a i . Finally, the fourth element in the cycle then equals t k,ℓ . is implies that v i = 1, a contradiction. If it is then the next element in the cycle must beā i (with f(k, ℓ) = a i ). is contradicts the previous fact. If it is then from the previous facts we must have that this cycle coincides with z 1,ℓ ≻ 1 t 1,ℓ ≻ 1 w 1,ℓ ≻ 1 z 2,ℓ ≻ 1 t 2,ℓ ≻ 1 w 2,ℓ ≻ 1 z 3,ℓ ≻ 1 t 3,ℓ ≻ 1 w 3,ℓ ≻ 1 z 1,ℓ . is implies that all literals in the clause C ℓ are true, which is a contradiction.
Observe that we can also exclude all alternatives w k,ℓ (because the next element is z k⊕1,ℓ ) and t k,ℓ (because the next element is either w k,ℓ or v k,ℓ ) from the cycle. As such, we have shown that the cycle in ≻ 1 contains no elements, hence, ≻ 1 is acyclic. is concludes the proof.
